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COMPLEX CASES AND JURY TRIALS:
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR ARNOLD *
JAMES S. CAMPBELL t AND NICHOLAS LE POIDEVIN i-
In his Article published in this issue,1 Professor Morris S.
Arnold concludes that there is "no good historical foundation for
the argument that plaintiffs may be denied the right to a jury trial
because their cases are complex." 2 In Professor Arnold's opinion,
to interpret the seventh amendment as permitting extraordinarily
complex cases to be withheld from juries is to adopt a position "at
odds with the current of American legal thought in the late
eighteenth century" and "without general support in the English
authorities of that age." 3
We submit that Professor Arnold's conclusions rest upon an
incomplete examination of the historical evidence. Part I of our
Reply shows that the framers of the seventh amendment intended
to incorporate into the amendment the distinction between suits at
common law and proceedings in equity as that distinction was made
in England in 1791. As Lord Devlin recently has shown,4 the
* The research contained in this Reply was originally undertaken by the
authors on behalf of the International Business Machines Corporation, a client of
the law firm of which Mr. Campbell is a partner and a party or amicus in several
pending cases that raise the issue of the right to a iury trial in complex civil
litigation. [The Editors].
f Member, District of Columbia Bar. B.A. 1960, Yale University; LL.B. 1964,
Stanford University.
f Barrister at Law, Middle Temple and Lincoln's Inn. B.A. 1972, LL.B. 1973,
M.A. 1976, University of Cambridge.
Mr. Campbell is responsible for part I and acknowledges with gratitude the
assistance of John P. Kaminski, Editor of the Documentary History of the Ratification
of the Constitution, University of Wisconsin-Madison, and David Westin of the
District of Columbia Bar. Mr. Le Poidevin is responsible for part H and
acknowledges with gratitude the assistance of Andrew N. Vollmer of the District
of Columbia Bar. Of course, the authors remain solely responsible for the contents.
'Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex
Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. Rv. 829 (1980).
2 Id. 848.
3 Id. 830 (footnote omitted).
4 See Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the
Seventh Amendment, 80 CoLum. L. REv. 43 (1980).
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practice in England at that time was for chancellors to make sure
that complex cases were tried as proceedings in equity, without a
jury, and not as suits at common law, with a jury. Part II re-
examines one of the early decisions relied on by Lord Devlin,
Towneley v. Clench.5 We demonstrate that, contrary to Professor
Arnold's view, Clench is good authority for the proposition that the
chancellor would prohibit trial at law of issues beyond the under-
standing of a jury.
I. THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT AND THE TRADITIONAL ENGLISH
BOUNDARY BETWEEN LAW AND EQUITY
Throughout our history, American courts have followed the
admonition of Mr. Justice Story that "it is the common law of
England, the grand reservoir of all our jurisprudence" 6 to which
the seventh amendment refers when it requires that "[i]n Suits at
common law . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved
. .. ." Professor Arnold suggests a different approach. He
urges that the "special affection" with which Americans regarded
the jury in 1791 creates an "aura" that should permeate any inter-
pretation of the seventh-amendment right to jury trial.8 That
"aura" makes the English historical allocation of cases between law
and equity quite secondary to an assertedly different American
experience-much more pro-jury and anti-equity-embodied in the
seventh amendment.9
There are two flaws, one minor and one major, in Professor
Arnold's suggested revision of seventh-amendment historical analy-
sis. First, a more balanced review of American historical evidence
shows that although eighteenth-century Americans did indeed
5 Cary 23, 21 Eng. Rep. 13 (Ch. 1603). Although the English Reports
reprint is headed "Clench v. Tomley," documents in the Public Record Office in
London show that the defendant's name was Clench and the plaintiffs name was
Towneley, rather than the reported "Tomley." The corrected spelling shall be
followed here.
6 United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No.
16,750).
7U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII. See, e.g., Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v.
Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935) ("The right of trial by jury thus preserved is
the right which existed under the English common law when the Amendment was
adopted."); Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309 n.1 (1920) (Brandeis, J.) ("The
right to a jury trial guaranteed in the federal courts is that known to the law of
England, not the jury trial as modified by local usage or statute.").
8 Arnold, supra note 1, at 831.
9 Id. 831-32.
[Vol. 128:965
DISCUSSION
treasure the civil jury, they also recognized the need for and legiti-
macy of equity. Second, and more to the point, however, it is the
intent of the framers of the seventh amendment, as reflected in the
language and legislative history of the amendment itself, that ulti-
mately must determine the historical scope of the constitutional
right to jury trial in civil cases-not some general "affection" or
"aura" inferred from colonial practice or rhetoric. When we look
at the amendment itself, and understand the process through which
it came to be adopted, we see that the constitutional boundary be-
tween law and equity established by the seventh amendment is the
same as the distinction drawn in England at that time.
A. American Attitudes Toward Law and Equity
A special affection for the jury does not necessarily imply a
special dislike of equity (or admiralty). One might wish to have
both (or all three), each in its proper place. Many eighteenth-
century American lawyers voiced strong support for equity law and
practice as necessary components of a legal system.10  Several
colonies-including, notably, New York and Virginia-modelled
their legal systems closely after that of England and thus had sepa-
rate chancery courts.'" Other colonies, such as New Hampshire,
otherwise not following the English plan, nevertheless at times re-
tained separate courts of equity.
12
The colonies of Pennsylvania and Massachusetts did not main-
tain separate courts with general equity jurisdiction. 13  Professor
Arnold urges that the experience of these two colonies somehow
demonstrates early America's special affection for juries and cor-
10 See 1 Tnz LAw PRAcTcE OF ALExNDER HAMmTOI 178-79 (J. Goebel ed.
1964) ("Except as lawyers . . . were drawn into political controversies over
Chancery, the provincial bar was fully aware of the importance of the equity
jurisdiction as a supplement to the common law and of its indispensability for the
vindication of the rights and claims of clients." (footnote omitted)).
"lSee T=z FEDERALIST No. 83, at 524-25 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed.
1961); Katz, The Politics of Law in Colonial America: Controversies over Chancery
Courts and Equity Law in the Eighteenth Century, in 5 PERSpECTVES Im AuEjcAN
HIS-ITORY 257, 262-64 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds. 1971). In New York, for
example, a supplement to the Duke's laws in 1665 provided that bills in equity
should proceed "'by way of Bill and delivering in Answers upon Oath and by the
Examination of witnesses, in like manner as is used in the Court of Chancery in
England."' L. FBIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AmERCAN LAW 47 (1973) (emphasis
supplied).
12 In New Hampshire, equitable jurisdiction was vested in the governor and
council prior to 1699. See L. FREDoMAN, supra note 11, at 47.
' 3 See Curran, The Struggle for Equity Jurisdiction in Massachusetts, 31 B.U.
L. R v. 269, 271-72 (1951); Katz, supra note 11, at 266-72.
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responding loathing of equity.14 A careful examination of the
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania experiences, however, demonstrates
that the absence of separate equity courts in these colonies was the
result of factors more subtle than an all-consuming desire for jury
trials.
Plainly, colonial Massachusetts was not opposed in principle to
courts of equity. Indeed, as Professor Katz has concluded, "there
was a recurrent desire among New Englanders for the establishment
of equity courts." 15 Thus, the legislature of the colony of Massa-
chusetts (called the "General Court") tried repeatedly in the late
seventeenth century either to create a separate court of chancery or
to authorize the Massachusetts Superior Court to act as a court of
equity. On each occasion, the General Court was overruled by the
Crown. 6 Because of these royal vetoes, no further attempt was
made to create a separate court of equity in Massachusetts after
1693. Instead, surrogate equity procedures soon developed in both
the county courts and in the General Court.1'7
14 Arnold, supra note 1, at 836, 837-38. Professor Arnold also finds special
significance in the fact that equity courts in colonial America often referred specific
questions of fact to juries for decision. Id. 836-37. But, as discussed by Lord
Devlin, this practice was common in England as well. See Devlin, supra note 4,
at 60-62. Its use in America, therefore, cannot be taken as evidence of some break
with English practice.
Professor Arnold also notes Thomas Jefferson's support for routine use of juries
in equitable proceedings, Arnold, supra note 1, at 836, but he fails to point
out that Virginia rejected Jefferson's innovation in 1783 after experimenting with
it for a six-year period. See An act to amend the acts for establishing the high
court of chancery and general court, Ch. XXVI, § III, 11 Va. Laws 342 (1783)
(W. Hening ed. 1821) (repealing Ch. XV, § XXVI, 9 id. 389 (1777)). Nor does
Professor Arnold mention that the First Federal Congress considered and rejected,
in enacting the Judiciary Act of 1789, a proposal that jury trials be required in
equity actions in the new circuit courts. See Warren, New Light on the History
of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HAInv. L. REv. 49, 78-79 (1924).
15 Katz, supra note 11, at 264.
16 See Katz, supra note 11, at 265; Woodruff, Chancery in Massachusetts, 5
L.Q. Rzv. 370, 373-75 (1889), reprinted in 9 B.U. L. Rzv. 168, 171-73 (1929).
Massachusetts's desire for equity jurisdiction apparently continued well into the
eighteenth century. See Katz, supra note 11, at 265; Equity Jurisdiction-Further
Discussion of History in Massachusetts and Maine, MAss. L.Q., Oct., 1947, at 49,
55 (editor's note).
17 Indeed, Massachusetts's refusal to entrust certain matters to juries for
resolution, despite the repeated royal vetoes of separate courts of equity, attests to
the general recognition among citizens of the Massachusetts Colony that juries
properly have only limited functions. Thus, it appears that from the beginning
of the Colony there was no right to jury trial of factual issues in certain types of
cases. These included divorce cases, see Parker v. Simpson, 180 Mass. 334, 351,
62 N.E. 401, 407 (1902), cases involving paupers, see Inhabitants of Shirley v.
Inhabitants of Lunenburgh, 11 Mass. 379, 385 (1814), cases involving the militia,
see Mountfort v. Hail, 1 Mass. 443, 452 (1805), probate cases, see Parker v.
Simpson, and cases in which only a very small amount of money was at stake,
see id. These causes were heard either in the county courts, see L. F Dm ,
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Nor does the dispute over equity courts in Pennsylvania illus-
trate an overwhelming preference for juries in civil trials. From
the evidence now available, it appears that in the seventeenth
century Pennsylvania had a dual system of equity-both at the local
level and through the governor and council-that functioned with-
out juries.'8 But in the eighteenth century the antiproprietary
party attempted to establish local control over equity courts by
transferring all equity jurisdiction to the county courts from the
high court in Philadelphia. 19 After some thirty-five years of debate
over this issue of who should dispense equity, a stalemate was
reached and general equity jurisdiction was abolished in 1736.20
In sum, a balanced study of colonial legal practice belies the
generality of Professor Arnold's conclusion that eighteenth-century
Americans were opposed to equity because of their "high regard for
the jury." 21 Professor Katz has offered a more careful assessment:
Equity law was accepted by all concerned [in colonial
America]-the dispute was over the constitution of the
courts that dispensed equity. The Crown and the pro-
prietors insisted upon a narrow, prerogative authority for
chancery courts, while most colonists were equally insistent
upon the need for legislative consent. . . . Finally, the
supra note 11, at 48 (the county courts of Massachusetts were made into probate
courts, with judges exercising the "full power and authority [of ecclesiastical
officials] . . . in England"), or in courts of general sessions of the peace, see
Inhabitants of Shirley v. Inhabitants of Lunenburgh.
In addition, cases involving forms of equitable relief not otherwise available
in the Massachusetts courts could be brought by petition to the General Court.
See Woodruff, supra note 16, 5 L.Q. BEv. at 372, 9 B.U. L. REv. at 170. Often
such cases would be referred to magistrates for decision. See, e.g., In re Roxbury
Schoole (General Court, 1st Sess., May 27, 1669), in 4 REcoRDs oF TaE GovEmon
.AN CoMTANY OF THE MASSAcnusETTs BAY, Pt. II, at 434 (N. Shurtleff ed. 1854).
In light of the variety of cases in which juries never were used in the
Massachusetts Colony, it is not surprising that in 1787 a Massachusetts Federalist
observed that "out of three or four hundred actions at a court not more than ten
are decided by jury." One of the Middling-Interest, Some Objections to the New
Constitution considered, Mass. Centinel, Nov. 28, 1787. Indeed, although this
eighteenth-century writer despaired of trying to set forth a federal requirement
governing jury trial in civil cases ("for there is no one point in which the states
more differ than in this"), he admitted that "there is one circumstance in which
[the states] all agree, viz. in deciding some cases of property without any jury
at all." Id. In response, an antifederalist, also apparently from Massachusetts, did
not take issue with "One of the Middling-Interest's" views concerning the disuse
of civil juries. Rather, he took issue with the Federalist's reasoning that "because
we will not have a jury when we do not want them, we shall not when we do."
One of the Common People, Boston Gazette, Dec. 3, 1787.
'8 Katz, supra note 11, at 266.
19 Id.
20 Id. 270.
21 Arnold, supra note 1, at 833.
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controversies had pretty well ceased by 1750, when the
generally recognized need for equity as part of the Anglo-
American legal system had resulted either in viable chan-
cery courts or in alternative devices in the existing com-
mon law system. Political criticism of chancery courts had
lost even its rhetorical usefulness.22
The notion that the American colonists had a "special affection"
for juries and a corresponding dislike for equity is not a reliable
basis for locating the seventh-amendment boundary between law
and equity.
B. The Legislative History of the Seventh Amendment
In order to determine the historical meaning of the seventh
amendment, one obviously must look beyond general sentiment to
the specific events leading up to the drafting and adoption of the
seventh amendment. For it is only through a review of such events
that one can hope to give more precise meaning to the framers'
preservation of the jury trial right "[i]n Suits at common law."
Remarkably, Professor Arnold fails to consider any of this legis-
lative history.
If the citizens of the newly formed United States had wished to
make some radical break with traditional English distinctions be-
tween equity and law, one would have expected them to do so in
the wholly new constitutions enacted by several states immediately
following the Revolution. But none of the civil jury trial pro-
visions in the constitutions or declarations of rights adopted by ten
of the original fourteen states 23 went so far as to require that all
civil cases be tried before a jury.24 Indeed, insofar as these pro-
2 2 Katz, supra note 11, at 282-83 (emphasis supplied); accord, L. FkmnmAN,
supra note 11, at 48 ("[The American Revolution did not abolish courts of
chancery. Chancery merely passed to new masters."); 1 THE LAw PRAcncE oF
ALEXANDER HAmiLTON, supra note 10, at 179 ("The public animadversions [to
equity] in the form of assembly resolves stemmed primarily from a deep-seated
resentment that the Crown had excluded the legislature from erecting any but
courts for small causes." (footnote omitted)).
23 Vermont, the fourteenth state, declared its independence from New York
and adopted its own constitution in 1777. It was admitted to the Union in 1791,
after it ratified the Constitution.
24 See 1 B. Scmv MTz, THE BiLL oF RIGHTs: A DocumER-RY IHIsTORY 235
(1971) (Virginia); id. 260 (New Jersey); id. 265 (Pennsylvania); id. 278
(Delaware); id. 280 (Maryland); id. 287 (North Carolina); id. 298-99 (Georgia);
id. 324 (Vermont); id. 342 (Massachusetts); id. 378 (New Hampshire).
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visions differed, it was in their specification of cases to which the
requirement of a jury did not extend.
25
The seventh amendment itself arose out of antifederalist at-
tempts to defeat ratification of the Constitution at the various state
ratifying conventions. 26 During the debates at these conventions,
those opposing the new Constitution repeatedly expressed their fear
that, absent some specific constitutional provision to the contrary,
the new federal Congress could eliminate all jury trials in civil
cases in the federal courts.27 Once again, however, just as no state
constitution had ensured jury trials in all civil cases, the anti-
federalists did not want every civil case to be tried as of right to a
jury. Those supporting ratification, on the other hand, did not
want the total elimination of civil juries. Rather, while apparently
agreeing that some civil cases should be tried to the jury, the fed-
eralists argued that the matter of which cases required jury trial
could prudently be left to Congress to decide,28 and that in any
event, the jury was not appropriate for all civil cases. 29
Seven proposed amendments to the federal Constitution con-
cerning the civil jury emerged from the state ratification debates.
Pennsylvania (a minority of the convention), Virginia, and North
Carolina suggested that the right should extend to "controversies
respecting property" and "suits between man and man." 80 A
25Compare Vmcm-u DECLAraTION OF RiGHTS oF 1776 art. 11, reprinted in
1 B. Sc-wAnrz, supra note 24, at 235 ("That in controversies respecting property,
and in suits between man and man, the ancient trial by Jury is preferable to any
other, and ought to be held sacred.") with MASSACHUSETTS DECLARATIoN OF
RiGPTS OF 1780 art. XV, reprinted in 1 B. ScHwAREz, supra note 24, at 342 ("In
all controversies concerning property, and in all suits between two or more persons,
except in cases in which it has heretofore been otherways used and practised, the
parties have a right to a trial by jury .... ").
26 At the Constitutional Convention a proposal to include a provision guar-
anteeing a right to jury trial in certain civil cases was rejected because it was
believed "not possible to discriminate equity cases from those in which juries are
proper," and because state provisions were considered adequate. 1 B. SCHWARTZ,
supra note 24, at 438 (quoting remarks of Mr. Gorham).
27 See, e.g., 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVED'rbONS, ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONsTITUTION 218 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1836) (remarks
of James Monroe at the Virginia ratification convention).
28See, e.g., 2 B. ScmvAnTz, supra note 24, at 639-40 (remarks of James
Wilson at the Pennsylvania convention); id. 691 (remarks of Christopher Gore at
the Massachusetts convention); id. 778 (remarks of Gov. Edmund Randolph at the
Virginia convention).
2 9 See, e.g., THE FE DaA=sT No. 83, supra note 11, at 527-28; 2 B. ScHwARTz,
supra note 24, at 639 (remarks of James Wilson at the Pennsylvania convention).
80 See 2 B. SCHWiARTZ, supra note 24, at 658, 841, 967 (Pennsylvania, Virginia, •
and North Carolina, respectively).
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minority of the Maryland convention would have restricted the
right to "actions on debts or contracts, and in all other controversies
respecting property." 31 Massachusetts and New Hampshire recom-
mended a provision securing, in diversity cases, the right to a jury
trial of issues of fact "arising in actions at common law." 32 Finally,
New York recommended an amendment stating: "That the trial by
Jury in the extent that it obtains by the Common Law of England
is one of the greatest securities to the rights of a free People, and
ought to remain inviolate." 33
These were the proposals before James Madison when he
undertook to draft the Bill of Rights during the First Federal
Congress. Madison, of course, was a federalist, a co-author with
Alexander Hamilton and John Jay of the Federalist Papers.34 He
steadfastly had resisted any attempt to add amendments to the
Constitution before its adoption, and as a delegate to the Virginia
Ratifying Convention he specifically opposed inclusion of a civil-
jury-trial provision.
3 5
In the proposed amendments that Madison submitted to Con-
gress, he included a provision that: "In suits at common law, be-
tween man and man, the trial by jury, as one of the best securities
to the rights of the people, ought to remain inviolate." 31 This
proposal is readily traceable to the state conventions' proposals from
which Madison drew. The reference to suits "between man and
man" plainly came from the proposals of the Pennsylvania minority,
31 Id. 732.
321d. 713 (Massachusetts) (emphasis supplied); id. 761 (New Hampshire).
33 Id. 913 (emphasis supplied).
The Livingston notes of the debate over the proposed civil-jury-trial amend-
ment at the New York ratifying convention show the Federalists (Hamilton and
Jay) anxious that the amendment not compel the use of juries in equity and
admiralty. The antifederalist proponents of the amendment (Yates and Jones)
met this concern by suggesting that the jury-trial right be available according to
the common law as in the English Court of Exchequer, which exercised both an
equitable and a legal jurisdiction. See id. 897; Devlin, supra note 4, at 51 n.22.
34 Indeed, because the Federalist Papers were meant to be the official Federalist
interpretation of the Constitution, it is apparent that Madison and others must have
shared the view expressed in The Federalist No. 83 that "to extend the jurisdiction
of courts of law to matters of equity will . . . tend gradually to change the
nature of the courts of law, and to undermine the trial by jury, by introducing
questions too complicated for a decision in that mode." TnE FEDERALIST No. 83,
supra note 11, at 528 (A. Hamilton). Insofar as Hamilton's views concerning the
civil jury were "idiosyncratic," therefore, see Arnold, supra note 1, at 832, the
"idiosyncrasy" was shared with Madison, the drafter of the seventh amendment,
and with those for whom the Federalist Papers spoke.
38 See Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57
MnqN. L. REv:. 639, 686-87 n.115 (1973).
3 1 ANNALs OF CoNG. 453 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789).
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North Carolina, and Madison's home state of Viriginia.3 7 The
reference to "suits at common law" came from the New York,
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire proposals. 38 Madison's pro-
posed right to jury trial in civil cases was referred to a select com-
mittee of eleven Congressmen, which deleted the Virginia reference
to suits "between man and man." The reference to suits at com-
mon law, however, was maintained.39
After the committee had reported out what was to become the
seventh amendment, and less than a month before Congress adopted
it, Jefferson wrote to Madison from Paris to comment on the draft
that Madison had forwarded to him. He liked Madison's draft "as
far as it goes; but I should have been for going further." 40 Spe-
cifically, Jefferson suggested in lieu of Madison's proposal: "All
facts put in issue before any judicature shall be tried by jury except
1. in cases of admiralty jurisdiction wherein a foreigner shall be
interested, 2. in cases cognisable before a court martial . . . , and
3. in impeachments allowed by the constitution." 41 Madison and
the Congress did not adopt Jefferson's suggestion or any others like
it, and the benchmark for application of the seventh amendment
remained the traditional line between suits at common law and
proceedings in equity.42
Two conclusions emerge from the legislative history of the
seventh amendment. The first, of course, is that the amendment
was born as an attempt to meet the concerns of a substantial num-
ber of Americans that juries be used in some civil cases. The
second conclusion derived from the legislative history of the seventh
amendment is that the amendment did not abandon, but instead
carefully maintained, the traditional English distinction between
suits at common law appropriate for jury resolution and proceed-
ings in equity requiring resolution by a judge.
43
37 See text accompanying note 30 supra.
3sSee text accompanying notes 32 & 33 supra.
39 See 2 B. ScnwAcrnz, supra note 24, at 1117; Wolfram, supra note 35, at 729.
40 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 28, 1789), reprinted
in 2 B. Sc.wAnrz, supra note 24, at 1140, 1143.
411d. (emphasis supplied).
42The version of the seventh amendment reported to the Congress by the
committee vent unchanged through the House, the Senate, and the ratifying state
legislatures, save for the addition of a dollar-value limitation. See Wolfram, supra
note 35, at 729-30.
4 3 Federal practice immediately following ratification of the seventh amendment
confirms that it was English practice to which Americans turned to define the
bounds of federal equity on this side of the Atlantic. Thus, the Supreme Court
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II. COMPLEXITY AS A GROUND FOR THE DECISION IN
Towneley v. Clench
Following his treatment of the American background of the
seventh amendment, Professor Arnold refers to Lord Devlin's recent
work demonstrating that chancellors of the eighteenth century exer-
cised jurisdiction over unusually complex cases.44 Professor Arnold
concludes to the contrary that there is no "evidence of an eighteenth-
century American or English belief that complexity was a ground
for the exercise of equitable jurisdiction." 45 To sustain his con-
clusion, Professor Arnold analyzes only two of the cases cited by
Lord Devlin: Towneley v. Clench4 6 and Blad v. Bamfield.47 The
focus of Professor Arnold's attack, however, is on Clench.
48
Before reexamining Clench, however, it should be emphasized
that the evidence for an equitable jurisdiction based on complexity
is not to be found solely or even principally in Clench and Blad.
Lord Devlin cites a range of authorities, many of them closer in
time to the adoption of the seventh amendment than Clench or
rule of August, 1792, provided that the outlines of the federal courts' equity
practice should be taken from the practices of King's Bench and English Chancery.
See 1 HIsToRY OF TBE SUPREME Count or THE UNrrD STATES 580 (J. Goebel
ed. 1971).
44 Devlin, supra note 4. Lord Devlin, whom Mr. Le Poidevin assisted in his
endeavor, first published his research as a private monograph. P. Devlin, Note on
the Suit at Common Law in England at the Time of the Seventh Amendment
(1791) (Dec., 1979) (copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review).
45 Arnold, supra note 1, at 848. While maintaining throughout his article
that there is no evidence to show that equity ever took jurisdiction on
grounds of complexity, Professor Arnold ultimately hedges his conclusion by stating
that even if one were to concede the existence of such a jurisdiction, no evidence
exists to show that it was exclusive. Id. 848. Granting that much, however,
concedes the argument. If equity had concurrent jurisdiction of complex cases,
thus giving the chancellor the discretion to bring them into the court of chancery,
and if the chancellor in fact exercised that discretion to take jurisdiction over a
particular case, then the litigation became a proceeding in equity and, being no
longer a "suit at common law," was removed from the scope of the seventh
amendment. As the Supreme Court held in Shields v. Thomas, 59 U.S. (18 How.)
253, 262 (1855), the seventh amendment, correctly interpreted, embraces neither
the "exclusive jurisdiction of courts of equity, nor that which they have exercised
as concurrent with courts of law" (emphasis supplied).
46 Cary 23, 21 Eng. Rep. 13 (Ch. 1603). See note 5 supra.
473 Swan. 604 (App.), 36 Eng. Rep. 992 (Ch. 1674). The case is more
fully reported in 1 Lona No=rnGAoM's CHANcRmY CASES 7-8, 106-08 (D. Yale ed.)
(Selden Society Vol. 73, 1957).
48 As for Blad v. Bamjield, Professor Arnold admits that there the Chancellor
stopped a common-law action and decided the case himself because a jury was
unsuited to decide it and admits that the decision supports the view that com-
plexity was a reason for withholding a case from a jury. Arnold, supra note 1,
at 846.
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Blad, and reference should be made to his work rather than to this
discussion for a full review of the evidence.
A. The Course of the Proceedings in Towneley v. Clench
Of all the authorities cited by Lord Devlin, it is Towneley v.
Clench 49 that Professor Arnold treats most fully. In that case,
Lord Keeper Ellesmere reportedly retained equitable jurisdiction
over a case because the outcome was "to be discerned by books and
deeds, of which the Court was better able to judge then a jury of
ploughmen." 90 Lord Devlin cautions against giving Clench "more
solemn scrutiny than its slender form invites," 51 but explains that
it is "clear authority for the proposition that the Chancellor would
prohibit the trial at common law of any issue which from its nature
he thought to be beyond the understanding of a jury." 52 Professor
Arnold, drawing conclusions from the court records rather than
from the report of the Chancellor's reasoning, doubts whether
Ellesmere ever made the reported statement and concludes that
"the obvious basis for jurisdiction was the superior process available
in equity." 53 He adds: "[T]he facts [of the case] seem remarkably
simple." 54
In fact, the record material is wholly consistent with the report,
and Professor Arnold's account omits an important fact derived
from the records. It is necessary first to summarize the course of
the proceedings. Towneley's bill,55 dated January 24, 1601, tells a
49 Cary 23, 21 Eng. Rep. 13 (Ch. 1603).
5O Id.
Professor Arnold questions the accuracy of the report by commenting upon
"the relatively unscientific and imprecise character of early reports," Arnold,
supra note 1, at 841 (although he later, and rather oddly, defers to what he
reads as the reporter's criticism of Ellesmere, id. 845). This treats the
report in a rather cavalier fashion. The reporters were unofficial in the sense that
they were not paid out of government funds, but that is still true; and although
the report is old, and some old reports are unreliable, there are excellent reports
dating back to the end of the thirteenth century. If the report's brevity suggests
treating it with caution, yet the reference to "a jury of ploughmen" is char-
aeteristic of Ellesmere, and carries its own stamp of authenticity. In comparing
the report with the material in the Public Record Office, it should be borne in
mind that the primary function of the latter was to record what the court had
done and not why it had done it. The report, however, was prepared for lawyers,
more interested in legal reasoning than in the facts of the particular case. Report
and record should therefore be read together.
51 Devlin, supra note 4, at 75.
52 Id.
5 3 Arnold, supra note 1, at 844.
54 Id.
55 Bill preferred by Francis Towneley, Towneley v. Clench (sworn Jan. 24,
1600 Ei.e., 1601]), Public Record Office, London [hereinafter cited as P.R.O.]
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straightforward story. Francis Vaughan was seised of various lands
(all freehold, according to Towneley) and died on July 21, 1600,
leaving them by will to Towneley in tail male.56 Towneley entered
the property and possessed himself of the title deeds, but while they
were being removed to safe-keeping an assistant of Clench, Bedolph,
took them by force and brought them to Clench.
Clench also claims the property, the bill continues, and has
entered into part of the lands devised to Towneley, a house called
"The George," making a lease of it to one Barsey, who has begun an
action in the King's Bench (sic) to establish his title.57 Barsey is
pressing the action intending to get a verdict before Towneley can
recover back his title deeds.
Towneley explains that he understands Clench is claiming
through his wife Mary Clench, and that Mary believes she is heir
to Francis Vaughan, being the granddaughter of Francis's brother
Anthony. Towneley meets her claim with the assertion that
Anthony was a bastard son of Sir Hugh Vaughan.58
Towneley does not specify what equitable relief he seeks but
he does give reasons for invoking the court's jurisdiction. One is
that the witnesses to prove Anthony a bastard are mostly living in
Guernsey and Jersey and other distant places, so that they cannot
be brought to England "to be deposed viua voce [sic]" 59 without
great expense and trouble. It is not obvious whether he wants the
court to take their evidence on commission or to act without it.
The other reason is that because Towneley has only just become
entitled to the lands, he does not know the dates or contents of the
title deeds, so that he cannot obtain them at common law (in an
action of detinue) and without them will be disinherited. It is
C2/Eliz/T3/60. A copy of Mr. Le Poidevins verbatim transcription from the
document in the Public Record Office is on file with the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review.
56 An estate in tail male is one type of an estate tail. Under an estate in
tail, the lands descend from the grantee to the heirs of 'his body, i.e., his lineal
descendants. The estate in tail male limits the descent to males. See C.
MoyNusA, INTODucToN To THE LAW OF REAL Phopm-ry 40 (1962).
57Clench's entry and lease probably was made purely for the purpose of
enabling Barsey to sue. It was usual by this time, where freehold title was in
question, for the claimant to make an artificial lease to a friend because the
action available to leaseholders, that of ejectment, was simpler than those specif-
ically designed for freeholders. See Alden's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 105a, 105b, 77 Eng.
Rep. 217, 218 (C.P. 1601).
58 Mary makes clear in her answer that she is not in fact claiming as heir to
Francis, but as heir to Anthony who she says was legitimate. Answer of Mary
Clench, Towneley v. Clench (sworn Apr. 29, 1601), P.R.O. C2/Eliz/T3/60.
59 Bill preferred by Francis Towneley, supra note 55.
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easy to infer what Towneley wanted: under those disabilities he
would have had great difficulty in defending Barsey's King's Bench
proceedings so that his immediate need was to enjoin Barsey's
action. Accordingly, on May 7, 1601, his counsel Francis Bacon 60
outlined to the court the contents of the bill (mentioning the loss
of the documents, though not the absence of witnesses) and asserted
that Towneley and those from whom he claimed had been in pos-
session for forty years and more.61 An injunction was thereupon
awarded against the common-law proceedings.
By that time Clench and his wife had already sworn their
answers to the bill.62 They maintained that originally Sir Hugh
Vaughan was seised of the land and died in August 1536, leaving
three lawful sons, George, Anthony and Francis, born in that
order.63 (Francis is the Francis Vaughan from whom Towneley
claims.) Subject to a gift of certain lands to his wife Blanche for
life, Sir Hugh, by will dated July 16, 1533, left his lands to George
in tail male, thereafter in default of male issue to Francis in tail
male, thereafter in default of male issue to Anthony in tail male,
followed by further remainders. It is evident that if that will was
effective, Mary Clench could not be entitled to the lands as
Anthony's heir, if only because she was not his heir male. Clench
therefore asserts that the will was void, an allegation in which, as
will be seen, there was certainly some substance. According to
Clench, on Sir Hugh's death intestate, the lands descended to
George, the eldest son and heir, who later died without issue;
Anthony then became entitled, as second son and George's heir,
though Francis managed to interpose himself and entered into pos-
session of the property. Towneley claims as Francis's devisee but,
Clench's answer continues, Anthony's title descended to Anthony's
son Hugh (grandson of Sir Hugh) and then to Hugh's daughter
Mary, now Clench's wife.
To the allegations raised in the answers, Towneley filed a
replication that acknowledges that Sir Hugh was seised of the lands
6OBacon was called to the bar in 1582 and became Solicitor General in 1607,
Attorney General in 1613, Lord Keeper in 1617, and Lord Chancellor in 1618. See
his entry in 1 DIcnoNARY OF NATIONAL BioGnpny 800-44 (1908) (reissue).
61P.R.O. C33/99, fol. 462v (May 7, 1601); id. C33/100, fol. 450.
62 Answer of Thomas Clench, Towneley v. Clench (sworn Feb. 7, 1601),
P.R.O. C2/Eliz/T3/60 (copy of verbatim transcription on file with the University
of Pennsylvania Law Review); Answer of Mary Clench, supra note 58.
,63Eventually, the court would find Anthony a bastard, partly on evidence
that Anthony was born before George and Francis. See note 70 & accompanying
text infra.
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and goes on to state that on his death the lands descended to George,
on whose death without issue they properly descended to Francis
rather than to Anthony. Dealing with Clench's assertion that
Anthony was the second legitimate son of Sir Hugh, Towneley re-
peats that he was a bastard." On that summary of the pleadings
(in which one allegation, to be mentioned shortly, has been de-
liberately omitted), the only issue between the parties seems to have
been whether Anthony was legitimate.65
On May 17, 1602, after Towneley had secured an injunction
against the King's Bench proceedings, Clench obtained an order
nisi that since the principal question between the parties was one
of bastardy, a typical jury question, it should be tried at law.6
That would have been accomplished simply by dissolving the in-
junction. But on June 14, 1602, it was ordered that the matter
should remain in chancery and go to a hearing there.6 7 The
grounds for the court's order were, first, that Towneley "dothe not
wholly insist vpon the said point of Basterdy but vpon some other
64 Replication of Francis Towneley, Towneley v. Clench (n.d.), P.R.O.
C2/Eliz/T3/60 (copy of verbatim transcription on file with the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review).
65 The opposing contentions are clearly
Towneley's, as set out in his bill
and replication, were as follows:
Sir Hugh Vaughan BlancheII
d. 1536
illegit. I1 legit.II
F
I
Anthony IGeorge
d. 1552
without
issue
Francis
d. 1600
devising
lands to
Towneley
expressed in pedigrees.
Clench's, as set out in his answer,
were as follows:
Sir Hugh Vaughan Blanche
d. 1536
legit.
George Anthony Francis
d. 1552 d. 1556-57 d. 1600
without
issue
€6 P.R.O. C33/102, fol. 584 (May 17, 1602).
67 Id. C33/102, fol. 674v (June 14, 1602).
Hugh
d. c. 1577
May = Thomas
Clench
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question"; 68 second, that Towneley and his predecessor had had
possession for about 50 years; 69 and third, that by Clench's own ad-
mission Bedolph had taken the title deeds with which Towneley
would have defended his title at common law and "contemptiously"
refused to bring them into court. The next and last significant step
in the case was the final decree, made on May 31, 1603. This recites
that the court found as a fact that Anthony had been a bastard and
decrees possession in favour of Towneley30 But for our purposes,
it is the decision of June 14, 1602 to retain the case in equity rather
than to let it go to the courts of law that is plainly the crucial one.
B. Towneley's Need For Discovery and Depositions
Professor Arnold suggests that equitable jurisdiction rested not
on the complexity of the case but on a two-fold inadequacy in
common-law procedure: the absence of a power to compel the pro-
duction of documents and the absence of a power to compel the
appearance of witnesses.71 This reasoning fails to distinguish be-
tween grounds for accepting equity jurisdiction in the first place
and grounds for refusing to let a jury decide the question of title
once the court has accepted jurisdiction of the dispute.
Consider first the documents that Bedolph had seized. That
an opponent had documents relevant to an action at law was cer-
tainly a good reason for a party to come into equity asking for
their production. Commonly, as in this case, he needed in addi-
68 Id.
69 Though lengthy possession would not in itself suffice to keep an ejectment
case from a jury, it may reinforce other reasons because a judge is more apt to
appreciate that lengthy possession is some evidence of rightful possession.
70The final decree was made with Ellesmere's personal authority. P.R.O.
C33/103, fol. 681 (May 31, 1603). (The records state that "the original is
signed with the hand of the Lord Keeper." Id. C33/104, fol. 722v (May 31, 1603)
(translated from Latin original)). It is, as Professor Arnold accurately states,
Arnold, supra note 1, at 842, a decree for quiet possession in Towneley's
favour "until better matter shalbe shewed in this Court to the contrary." P.R.O.
C33/103, fol. 681. It is based on a finding of fact that Anthony was born a
bastard of Sir Hugh and Blanche before their marriage. That finding derived from
the following evidence: 1) on Sir Hugh's death George was found to be his son
and heir by inquisition post mortem; 2) by several manorial court rolls of present-
ments made in the time of Queen Mary, Francis was found to be the brother and
heir of George, although Anthony was still alive; 3) by a book recording the
education of Sir Hugh's children and by the depositions of many witnesses it
appeared Anthony was many years older than George; and 4) that by Sir Hugh's
will the lands were entailed to George, then Francis, and lastly Anthony suggested
that Anthony was illegitimate. Additional grounds for the decree were that
Francis had been in possession for close to 50 years and that Towneley's title-deeds
had been taken from him by Bedolph and handed to Clench.
71 Arnold, supra note 1, at 844.
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tion a temporary injunction against the proceedings at law while
he obtained his equitable remedy. But once the documents were
produced, there was no reason why the action should not proceed
to trial by a jury; and in fact equitable suits for discovery only in
aid of proceedings at law were common.7 2 Towneley's complaint
that the absence of his title-deeds disabled him from defending the
action of ejectment would have justified equitable intervention,
but it would not ordinarily have resulted in a permanent with-
drawal of the case from a jury.
Professor Arnold also suggests that in fact the title-deeds never
were produced,73 but if that is right it does not strengthen his argu-
ment; if Ellesmere felt able to issue a decree in the absence of the
title-deeds, there would have been no difficulty in a jury's similarly
rendering a verdict. If it be objected that the decree was on the
face of it subject to review ("until better matter shalbe shewed"),
the same would have been true of a jury verdict, since for technical
reasons the loser in an ejectment was at this time always (and in-
conveniently) able to begin a fresh action and to try his luck with
another jury.74
Similar reasoning applies to the other ground of equitable
jurisdiction relied on by Professor Arnold-the supposed absence of
a common-law power to compel the attendance of witnesses. Al-
though the common-law courts did have such a power, it would not
have reached to the Channel Islands; 75 and, of course, one can well
see that in Towneley's case, as his bill alleges, it would have been
very troublesome and costly to fetch witnesses over from Guernsey
and Jersey. The Court of Chancery could issue a commission to
examine witnesses overseas, and perhaps depositions were taken in
that way.7 6 But again, this ground of equitable intervention would
72 See, e.g., Throckmorton v. Griffin, Tot. 18, 21 Eng. Rep. 110 (Ch. 1595)
(establishing a right of common); see generally J. MrrFoRD, A TREATISE ON THE
PLEADINGS IN SUITS IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY BY ENGLISH BILL 52 (2d ed.
London 1787).
73Arnold, supra note 1, at 844. It may in fact be that the title-deeds
seized by Bedolph had been brought into court by the time of the final decree,
as the decree makes provision for the distribution of certain unspecified "evidences."
P.R.O. C33/103, fol. 681 (May 31, 1603).
74 Coke refers obliquely to this rule in Ferrer v. Arden, 6 Co. Rep. 7a, 9a,
77 Eng. Rep. 263, 266 (C.P. 1599). See also 7 W. HoLswo=an, A I-EsToRY OF
ENGLISH LAw 16-17 (2d ed. 1937).
7. 1 W. HOLDSWORm, supra note 74, at 520-21 (6th ed. 1938); see A.
EAGLESTO N, Tim CHANNEL ISLANDS UNDER TUDOR GOVERNMENT, 1485-1642, at
30 (1949).
76 The decree in Clench mentions depositions but it is not clear which wit-
nesses were deposed.
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not have justified excluding a jury once the depositions had been
taken. It would have been perfectly possible to permit a trial at
law and to order the depositions to be used in its course.
77
C. The Complex "Other Question"
Professor Arnold thus fails to explain why the court refused to
allow the question of title to go to a jury in 1602 or why it
affirmed that decision by making a decree itself in 1603. Nothing
would have been simpler than dissolving the injunction and allow-
ing Barsey's ejectment action to go to trial. The three reasons
given in 1602 for not taking that course have already been set out.78
The length in time of Francis Vaughan's possession is one. The
absence of the title-deeds is another; but that cannot still have been
operative in 1603 given that the Lord Keeper felt able to issue a
decree. The third is that Towneley was insisting on "some other
question" besides the dispute about Anthony's legitimacy. Al-
though this question is not specified in the record of the refusal of a
trial at law, a perusal of Clench's answer and Towneley's replication
shows that a point had arisen which could have resolved the whole
case in Towneley's favour independently of Anthony's legitimacy.
It is the only other point which could have done so and must be
the other question referred to by the court in 1602. Moreover, the
matter raised by Towneley, which is the important fact overlooked
by Professor Arnold's account, is a point of considerable complexity
and sufficiently explains Ellesmere's description of the case as un-
suited to the consideration of a jury of ploughmen.
The point was this. Sir Hugh Vaughan's will gave the lands
in tail male first to George, then to Francis, and finally to Anthony.
As mentioned above,79 if the will was valid, Clench's claim failed
irrespective of Anthony's legitimacy, because Mary Clench could
not be Anthony's heir male. In his answer,80 therefore, Clench as-
serted that the will was invalid because Sir Hugh had died before
the enactment of the Statutes of Wills.81 Towneley's other point
was that the will might be valid. 2 This other point makes it neces-
77 See, e.g., Exton v. Turner, 2 Cas. Ch. 80, 22 Eng. Rep. 856 (1681) (wit-
nesses were aged and liable to die before the trial could be held).
7 8 See notes 67-70 supra and accompanying text.
79 See notes 62-65 supra and accompanying text.
80Answer of Thomas Clench, supra note 62.
a' Statute of Wills, 1540, 32 Hen. 8, c. 1; Statute of Wills, 1542, 34 & 35
Hen. 8, c. 5.
8 2 See Replication of Francis Towneley, supra note 64.
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sary to explain the background to those Statutes, passed in 1540 and
1542, and the Statute of Uses, passed in 1535.3
Under the law as it stood both before and immediately after
the Statute of Uses, land could not be devised at common law. If a
person died seised of land, it automatically devolved on his heir
and any testamentary attempt to alter that process was in general
simply ineffective. However, would-be testators were able to give
themselves what was in effect, though not technically, a power of
devise by means of a use, which corresponds to the modern trust.
The use was employed whenever it was desired to separate legal
entitlement from beneficial enjoyment, as, for example, where land
was to be given for the benefit of an infant. The donor would
convey the land to the trustee (the "feoffee to uses") who held it
and administered it on the infant's behalf ("to the use of" the in-
fant). In the eyes of the common law, the feoffee to uses was the
absolute owner, but the Court of Chancery would enforce his duties
to the beneficiary.
Where the device was to be employed as a substitute for a
power to devise, the would-be testator conveyed his lands to one or
more feoffees, who might be expected to outlive him, to hold to
the testator's own use. The legal title to the land remained in the
feoffees both before and after the testator's death, but his will could
effectively dispose of the beneficial interest as he wished. This
device, however, was disliked by the king for a quite collateral
reason: because the testator did not die seised of the land, his estate
evaded certain feudal dues that were payable to the king when a
landowner died seised.
To prevent this result, the Statute of Uses was passed. It did
not prohibit the creation of uses, but it provided that they should
be "executed," that is, a legal title to the lands equivalent to the
beneficial interest became vested in the beneficiary. Thus the
feoffees to uses dropped out of the picture altogether.
The Statute came into force on May 1, 1536,84 and at first was
assumed to have succeeded in the intended abolition of the employ-
ment of the use as a substitute for a power of devise. On a con-
veyance from a grantor to the feoffee to uses with the grantor
retaining the use of the property, it was assumed that by force of
the Statute the legal fee simple would never leave the grantor, the
would-be testator: the feoffee was to hold to the use of the grantor
83 Statute of Uses, 1535, 27 Hen. 8, c. 10. The following explanation is
necessarily somewhat simplified. For a fuller treatment see R. MEGA RY & H.
WA E, Tam L.ww OF REAL NoPERTY 155-67 (4th ed. 1975).
84 Statute of Uses, 1535, 27 Hen. 8, c. 10, § 11.
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and that use was executed. Because the grantor would die still
seised, his heir would take at common law and have to pay the
feudal dues. The abolition of the effective power of devise was
extremely unpopular and a few years later the Statutes of Wills
were passed, giving testators a qualified power of devise effective at
law but preserving the king's right to the feudal dues.
In the course of the sixteenth century, however, it was realized
that the Statute of Uses could be evaded8s if, for example, the
testator conveyed lands to his feoffee to his own use subject to a
power to appoint further uses by will. By force of the Statute, the
testator received back a qualified legal fee that was determined on
his exercise by will of the power of appointment. Thus the bene-
ficiaries of his will received such interests as he appointed, interests
which took effect at law and not merely (as before the Statute) in
equity.86 Testators were thereby enabled to exercise a general
power of devise, in place of the qualified power conferred by the
Statutes of Wills.
The bearing all this has on Clench's claim against Towneley is
made clear in the answers and replication. Sir Hugh Vaughan
made his will on July 16, 1533, before the Statute of Uses, but he
died in August, 1536, a few months after the Statute had come into
force. Clench asserts that the will was void because Sir Hugh died
after that Statute and before the first Statute of Wills took effect in
1540.87 He also adds a denial that Sir Hugh's lands were held in
use. Towneley, in his replication, controverts this last allegation:
in 1532-33, Sir Hugh conveyed his lands away to his own use, no
doubt as a preparatory step in making his will. Thereafter he made
his will, then the Statute of Uses supervened, whereupon Sir Hugh
became seised again, and subsequently died.88
Up to this point Towneley's version of events does not prove
Sir Hugh's will valid because Towneley does not set out the terms
of the conveyance of 1532-33. Nevertheless, Towneley quite clearly
leaves open for himself the possibility that the will was valid, pre-
85 The Statute gave rise to numerous difficulties of interpretation. Shortly
before Clench, Francis Bacon, one of Towneley's counsel, had described it as "a
law whereupon the inheritances of this realm are tossed at this day like a ship
upon the sea, in such sort, that it is hard to say which bark will sink, and which
will get to the haven; that is to say, what assurances [i.e., dispositions of land]
will stand good, and what will not." F. BAcoN, Reading on the Statute of Uses,
in LAw TRAcTs 299, 299 (London 1737) (text of reading at Grays Inn in 1600).
80 See Co. Litt. 111b; see generally Megarry, The Statute of Uses and the
Power to Devise, 7 CAMmunou L.J. 354 (1941).
s7 Answer of Thomas Clench, supra note 62.
Ss Replication of Francis Towneley, supra note 64.
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sumably on the footing that it constituted an appointment under a
power which might have been reserved on the conveyance.
Towneley states that when Sir Hugh died, George took as son and
heir at law in fee simple or else as tenant in tail under the will.89
Then he adds an allegation that, if true, would show that Sir
Hugh's will had all along been regarded as quite possibly valid: in
1591-92 Francis Vaughan suffered a common recovery.90 This wag'
a species of collusive litigation that had the effect of enlarging an
interest in tail into a fee simple. It was a useful step for Francis to
take if and only if it was possible that he had a fee tail rather than
a fee simple, that is, if it was possible that he had taken under Sir
Hugh's will rather than as heir at law. Moreover, alleging the
common recovery disposed of the remaining difficulty in Towneley's
way. Proving the validity of Sir Hugh's will would eliminate Mary
Clench's claim but of itself would not give Towneley a title, be-
cause there is nothing to suggest that he was Francis's heir male so
as to enable him to take under the entail. But the common re-
covery, by giving Francis a fee simple, entitled Francis to dispose of
it by will, thereby allowing Towneley to claim as Francis's devisee.
It should be said that Sir Hugh's will would almost certainly
have been regarded as invalid upon his death in 1536, because the
devices for avoiding the effect of the Statute of Uses had not then
been invented. But they were in use by the end of the sixteenth
century; and it is plain that in retrospect the invalidity of the will
was regarded as dubious. The fact that Francis Vaughan went to
the trouble of suffering a common recovery is proof enough of that.
In his replication, therefore, Towneley specifically reserves the
point that Sir Hugh's will was effective and binding.91 That on its
own would have sufficed to defeat Clench, whether or not Anthony
Vaughan was a bastard. It is the only point that fits the court's
reference in 1602 to the "other question" on which the plaintiff
was insisting.
92
It is also a point that thoroughly justifies the court's refusal to
dissolve the injunction and allow a trial at law on the grounds given
in Cary's report. A jury of ploughmen, in order to decide the
general question of title in the ejectment proceedings, would have
needed instruction in the method of disposing of land by will before
the Statute of Uses, the effect of that Statute, the special significance
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 See text accompanying notes 67-70 supra.
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of a death between 1535 and 1540, and the possible ways in which a
will might take effect despite the Statute. If this exposition has
been lengthy and tedious, it would equally have taxed the mind of
a seventeenth-century juror.
